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Many investors remember the fact that the stock market of China has 
experienced a wave of crazy twists during the period from 2005 to 2009. Since the end 
of 2014 the stock market has indicated that the market seems to have forgotten 
memories of the past. Investors in the secondary market are not rational. For example, 
a listed company that had several financial fraud records still sought after by investors. 
These phenomena show that investors in the capital market, especially in the 
secondary market, are still irrational and have no “memorizing ability”. In that case, 
the primary market and professional institutional investors are rational enough or not? 
This issue will be discussed in this paper.  
In this paper, the objects are projects of sponsor representatives whose historical 
performance of the project exists reversal (ie "dishonesty" record). The sample is IPOs 
from October 2010 to the end of 2012. The purpose of this study is to understand 
whether the participants of capital market could memorize “dishonesty" records of 
sponsor representatives and respond in their new IPO projects. We find that 
“dishonesty" information of sponsor representatives have no effect on the secondary 
market investors’ investment behavior. However, the primary market investors will 
capture this information, but the extent of the reaction is kind of limited. When 
institutional investors participate in the IPO inquiry offline, "dishonest" sponsor 
representatives of the companies appears relatively lower divergence, because the 
market may believe such projects probably have potential risk factors, when they make 
the decision, they will be more cautious and conservative, so that the IPO "three high" 
environment can be suppressed to some extent. And this behavior somehow improves 
the pricing efficiency of IPO. On the other hand, institutional investors won’t be 
affected by the sponsor representative of "dishonesty" recorded at the end of period, 
because institutional investors will probably pay more attention to other factors, such 
as market sentiment. 
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刻的印象，2005 年 6 月-2007 年 10 月间股市疯涨让整个市场情绪趋于疯狂，而
随后截至 2008年 10月，上证综指下跌超过七成的灾难使众多投资者蒙受巨额经
济损失；然而近年来，相似的历史再度出现，上证综指从 2014 年 10 月底的
2420.18 点一路疯涨到 2015 年 6 月 12 日的 5166.35 点，涨幅达 113.47%，而自
此之后急转直下，在两个多月的时间内跌去近一半市值，2015 年 8月 26日，上
证综指回落到 2927.29 点。对于历次灾难式的市场动荡，投资者自然记忆犹新，
但未必能够反映到其投资和定价行为中。从微观角度来看，2011 年上市的万福

















































































































































































户（特别是 IPO 客户）的经济利益，调查公布以后，作为调查目标的承销商的 IPO
市场份额将会显著下降，并且其历史客户的股价也会随之下降。作者认为这一效
应是由于 SEC 的调查行为造成了承销商声誉的损害，从而引致的市场对其的惩




















鉴于研究的市场主体为保荐代表人群体的 IPO 项目，因此下面对 IPO 的价格











































而致使 IPO 首日价格高估，则能够较为完整地解释 IPO 抑价行为以及后市表现疲










































































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
